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Abstract
Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to 
“microfoundations for macroeconomics”, the literature on free banking 
contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic 
concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoners Dilemma 
model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the 
possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, 
in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models 
have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example 
which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction 
configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free 
banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot 
Prisoners Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a 
sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for 
the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the 
establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit 
assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between 
the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged 
that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not 
necessarily adopt a “myopic”, self-regarding perspective but may
recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking 
sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a 
different matrix representation emerge.
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31.   Introduction
1.1.   The institutional turn in business cycle theorizing
Different causal explanations of the business cycle typically lead 
to different sorts of policy advice. Whereas the new classical 
economists had essentially made a case against discretionary policy 
activism and in favour of rules, based on a set of arguments including 
the policy ineffectiveness proposition, the Lucas critique and time 
inconsistency, thus providing a sustained challenge to the monetarist 
as well as the Keynesian orthodoxies, the new Keynesian school has 
provided rigorous microfoundations to explain why markets may fail 
to clear due to wage and price stickiness, thus accounting for 
involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon and 
providing a rationale to justify interventionist policies to stabilize the 
economy. Remarkably none of these better known paradigms has 
provided a fundamental criticism of the prevailing monetary 
institutional framework.
Among the various conceptualizations of business cycle 
phenomena and the concomitant policy and/or reform proposals only
the Austrian paradigm occupies a unique place on account of the truly
radical character of its proposals for institutional reform.
Since on the Austrian account of boom and bust, the bust is 
simply the market´s recognition of the unsustainability of the previous 
credit-induced boom, the Austrians´ policy advice to the central bank 
would consist of prevention rather than cure: do not engage in credit 
expansion in the first place.1 But since abiding by this imperative is 
notoriously difficult both politically and technically, what is 
4apparently needed is fundamental reform rather than policy 
prescription. Beginning with Hayeks 1976 Denationalisation of Money
several attempts have been made, by Austrian economists and fellow 
travelers, to provide theoretically possible and consistent alternatives 
to existing central banking regimes. While some degree of variation 
can be discerned among the different proposals, the common thread 
in these proposals consists is an argument to the effect that nothing 
less than a thoroughly decentralized banking system, one in which the 
market rate of interest is an unbiased approximation of the natural 
rate, may be the ultimate solution to the problem of boom and bust.  
The search for institutional alternatives to prevailing central 
banking regimes has thus led to a closer examination of the 
hypothetical working characteristics and the internal dynamics of 
possible systems of “free” banking, that is to say decentralized and 
non-hierarchical monetary systems in which banks would engage in 
the competitive supply of money. According to one such proposal, 
developed by, among others, L. White (1989; 1995), G. Selgin (1988) 
and L. Sechrest (1993), in the free banking system market 
mechanisms would move each of the unprivileged private banks which 
would engage in the unrestricted competitive issue of specie-
convertible money, as well as the banks as a group, toward 
equilibrium and would so restrain them from over-issuing. Monetary 
instability and business cycles as they typically result from central-
bank activity would disappear.
The superiority of a fractional-reserve free banking system is 
perceived as being related to the speed with which the self-correcting 
mechanism operates to reverse an over-issue by any single bank. 
Under the free banking system of multiple competing note issuers, the 
check against over-issues by any single bank is more rapid and direct, 
because of the negative feedback provided by interbank clearings.
Under a central banking system of a single monopoly note issuer, the 
check against excessive note issue is attenuated; the corrective 
process is likely to take more time before it exercises its discipline on 
5the central bank. In the meantime the central bank may have 
sufficient time to generate an artificial boom through the injection of 
new money. (White 1995) Accordingly credit expansion would be more 
limited and kept within narrower boundaries under fractional-reserve 
free banking than may be the case under central banking.
The proposal of a system of fractional-reserve free banking has 
been challenged, however, by authors who advocate a return towards 
a 100% reserve requirement in banking. According to these authors 
the alleged advantages of fractional-reserve free banking are largely if 
not entirely illusory. It is claimed by these authors that fractional-
reserve free banking would be inherently unstable, foster credit 
expansion and thus “inevitably” lead to the introduction or the re-
introduction of a central bank. The only mechanism which can render 
the monetary system proof against recurring boom-bust cycles is a 
100% reserve requirement.
In order to better understand the rationale of various proposals 
of free banking as well as the radical nature of the proposals for 
institutional reform which have been proposed within the Austrian 
paradigm, we have to appreciate the causal role of credit expansion 
within the Austrian account of boom and bust.   
1.2. How credit expansion creates an unsustainable mix of 
incompatible market forces
Despite its considerable explanatory power and its relevance for 
the comprehension of real-world phenomena, the Austrian theory of 
the business cycle had remained comparatively unknown until quite 
recently. In conventional overviews of developments in business cycle 
theory since Keynes General Theory, the theory was on occasion 
mentioned in an introductory section devoted to the “History of 
Business Cycle Theory”, or Hayek was mentioned in an appendix 
explaining “The Over-investment Theory”. (see e.g. Arnold 2002)  Since 
some time this situation has begun to change. As a result of the 
6important contributions of R. W. Garrison (among others), it is today 
no exaggeration to assert that in the global macroeconomic landscape 
the Austrian macroeconomic school has acquired a respectable place 
among the various other macroeconomic schools and paradigms, and 
that it is there to stay.
In the capital-based account of the business cycle, credit 
expansion figures prominently as a causal factor underlying the 
boom-bust sequence.  According to the Austrians, the market is 
capable of allocating resources in conformity with intertemporal 
preferences on the basis of a market-determined (natural) rate of 
interest. It follows, then, that an interest rate substantially influenced 
by extra-market forces will lead to an intertemporal misallocation of 
resources.  The capital-based theory of the business cycle is thus a 
theory of boom and bust with special attention to the extra-market 
forces that initiate the boom and the market´s own self-correcting 
forces that turn boom into bust. 
In the case of an artificial boom, the change in the interest-rate 
signal and the change in resource availabilities are at odds with one 
another. To the extent that the central bank pads the supply of 
loanable funds with newly created money, the interest rate is lowered 
just as it is with an increase in saving, but in the absence of an actual 
change in time preferences, no additional resources for sustaining the
policy-induced boom are being made available. In fact, facing a lower
interest rate, people will save less and spend more on current
consumables. Seemingly favourable credit conditions encourage the 
initiation of long-term investment projects at the same time that
the resources needed to see them through to completion are
being consumed. Consumers and investors become engaged in a tug-
of-war. The central bank´s credit expansion drives a wedge between 
saving and investment. It results in an incompatible mix of market 
forces. The artificial boom is thus characterized by malinvestment and 
overconsumption. (Mises 1998) In terms of a familiar device introduced 
by Hayek and often used in expositions by Austrian macroeconomists, 
7we can say that the triangle is being pulled at both ends against the 
middle. The now familiar graphical depiction of a policy-induced 
boom-and-bust cycle combines the Hayekian triangle and the simple 
analytics of the loanable funds market with the Garrisonian 
production possibilities frontier: 
C
Stages of production                                                                                                 I          
Interest rate Saving
Saving plus credit expansion
i eq
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Investment
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The wedge driven between saving and investment in the 
loanable funds market and the tug-of-war that pulls the economy 
beyond its production possibility frontier are manifested in the 
economys capital structure as clashing triangles. In the case of a 
saving –induced capital restructuring, the derived-demand effect and 
the discount effect work together to reallocate resources toward the 
earlier stages. In the case of credit expansion, the two effects work in 
opposition to one another. The time-discount effect, which is strongest 
in the early stages, attracts resources to long-term projects. These 
excessive allocations to long-term projects are called malinvestment in 
the Austrian literature. The derived-demand effect, which is strongest 
in the late stages, draws resources in the opposite direction so as to 
satisfy the increased demand for consumer goods. The malinvestment 
8is therefore accompanied by overconsumption. In the end real resource 
constraints remain binding, however, and a bust is the eventual but 
inevitable resolution to the problem.
1.3. The Prisoners Dilemma and the search for adequate 
micro-foundations 
It is today commonplace to point out that macroeconomics 
should be grounded in choice-theoretic microfoundations. Whereas 
the new classical approach had put a strong emphasis on 
underpinning macroeconomic theorizing with neoclassical choice-
theoretic microfoundations within a Walrasian general equilibrium 
framework and had thus basically consisted in adapting macro theory 
to orthodox neoclassical market-clearing microfoundations, the new 
Keynesian theorists, while they agree that macroeconomic theories 
require solid microeconomic foundations, have also recognized
the importance of a whole variety of real-world imperfections. 
Problems associated with asymmetric information, heterogeneous 
agents and imperfect and incomplete markets etc. are not assumed 
away. They have thus basically preferred to adapt micro to macro 
theory.
These relatively recent developments should not blind us to the 
fact that, as regards the recognition of the need for macroeconomic 
theories to be grounded in microeconomic foundations, the Austrian 
economists were clearly precursors. Methodological individualism and 
a rejection of excessive macro-economic formalism have been constant 
themes in Austrian methodological writings.2 While Austrian 
macroeconomists in general thus do not question the now mainstream 
consensus regarding the need or at least the desirability of providing 
macroeconomic theories with adequate choice-theoretic foundations, 
this stance has often been accompanied by the proviso that their own 
variant of microeconomics – designated as Mengerian or as 
praxeological – should be clearly distinguished from the neoclassical
9variant. Austrians have thus on occasion highlighted the peculiar 
character of their own approach to the issue of  “microfoundations for 
macroeconomics”. 
It should immediately be noted, however, that this stance has 
not always been consistently maintained. For instance while various 
argumentative strategies have been used in the context of the debate 
on free banking, the advocates as well as the opponents of fractional-
reserve free banking, in their attempts to scrutinize the actual 
incentives toward credit expansion that the banks would face within a 
fractional-reserve free banking system, have on occasion resorted to 
arguments drawn from game theory and in particular to the 
interaction configuration known as the Prisoners Dilemma. 
The fact that the same game-theoretical model is used by participants
on both sides in a debate in order to support divergent conclusions –
in casu concerning the working characteristics of fractional-reserve 
free banking - is sufficiently remarkable in itself to warrant a closer 
examination of the respective arguments. Is it true that game theory, 
and in particular the Prisoners Dilemma model, are basically “a gun 
for hire”, which can be used almost ad libitum for various purposes, as 
some have claimed, or is it possible to unambiguously distinguish 
between correct applications of the Prisoners Dilemma and incorrect 
ones in this connection? In the remainder of this paper it will appear 
that Prisoners Dilemma game type of arguments have been used with 
various degrees of success. 
1.4. The multifarious uses of the Prisoners Dilemma 
model in economics
The applications in theoretical and applied economics of the 
interaction configuration which is known in game theory as the 
Prisoners Dilemma are varied and numerous. Formally, a game with 
two or more players is a Prisoners Dilemma if each has a unique 
dominant strategy and an inefficient outcome results when each plays 
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his or her dominant strategy. (Campbell 2006, 47) The Prisoner´s 
Dilemma is the paradigmatic example of self-interested, rational 
behavior not leading to a socially optimal result. (Mas-Colell et al. 
1995, 237) A conventional representation of the pay-off structure of 
the Prisoner´s Dilemma game is for instance the following:
Player B
C                    D
C                      Q: 3 , 3            S: 1 , 4
Player A
D                   P: 4 , 1            R: 2 , 2
The outcome matrix represents a Prisoner´s Dilemma if and only 
if Player A´s preference ordering of the outcomes is P > Q > R > S, and 
Player B´s preference ordering is S > Q > R > P.
The Prisoner´s Dilemma is not an Austrian invention, however.3
In view of the Austrians´ more or less outspoken preference for 
Mengerian microfoundations, the recurrent use of Prisoner´s Dilemma
type of arguments in Austrian writings may at first seem somewhat 
remarkable. On occasion one finds in the work of one and the same 
author a defense of Austrian and in particular Mengerian 
microfoundations as well as explicit arguments invoking a game-
theoretical model such as the Prisoner´s Dilemma. An example is 
provided by Horwitz´ (2000) Microfoundations and Macroeconomics.
Despite his endorsement of a Mengerian approach to microeconomics 
as the foundations for macroeconomics and of a Mengerian conception 
of the competitive process, this author repeatedly invokes the 
Prisoner´s Dilemma in his explanation of why economy-wide changes 
in prices necessitated by monetary disequilibrium are problematic.
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Each individual seller would like to cut prices when faced with 
slackening sales, but none is willing to do so without some assurance 
that other sellers will do the same. The result is therefore sub-optimal: 
no one cuts prices when everyone should. (e.g. Horwitz 2000, 145)
The falling price level is a public good of sorts and each actor wishes 
to reap the benefits of the needed decline, but no one is able to bear 
the cost of starting the process. With everyone trying to free ride off 
the desired result, it never occurs. No individual has an interest in 
doing what would, if done collectively, benefit all. This, Horwitz 
argues, is a classic Prisoner´s Dilemma. (ibid. 158)
The major advantage of fractional-reserve free banking, Horwitz 
pursues, is precisely that it does adjust the nominal quantity of 
money to equilibrate potentially devastating monetary disequilibria 
rather than leaving that burden to the price level. One central 
shortcoming of 100% reserve banking, according to this author, is 
that it is unable to do this and that it relies on the price level to bear 
the burden of adjustment. (ibid. 229) Clearly in this instance the 
Prisoner´s Dilemma model is used in an attempt to justify credit 
expansion by the fractional-reserve free banking system.
It is certainly doubtful whether this argument is supported by 
conventional price theory and whether the underlying hypothesis of 
fundamental price stickiness, even in the absence of institutional 
barriers to price flexibility, is indeed descriptive of real-world 
situations. Besides these obvious objections, it should be clear why 
Horwitz´s who-goes-first argument, especially when considered as an 
argument for the superiority of a fractional-reserve free banking 
system in comparison with a system based on a 100% reserve 
requirement, is obviously fallacious. 
According to monetary disequilibrium theorists such as Horwitz, 
not the price rigidities per se but deflationary pressures constitute the 
originating factor of depressions. Excess demands for money and not 
price rigidities are the originating factor of depressions. Furthermore, 
the monetary disequilibrium theorists argue that excess demands for 
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money need not lead to depression and unemployment, if the 
monetary system responds quickly to such excesses by creating 
additional nominal supplies of money. There are several problems with 
this view.
A first objection consists in pointing out that if there
exists something like a who-goes-first problem, a policy of
accommodating excess demands for money might worsen it because of 
a moral-hazard type of problem.
Furthermore the conclusion of Horwitz, considered as an 
argument against the 100% reserve requirement in banking, is clearly
flawed for the following reasons. When monetary disequilibrium 
theorists like Horwitz refer to downward pressures upon the general 
price level due to excess demands for money they mostly implicitly 
have in mind the kind of special circumstances as they prevail in a 
fractional-reserve banking system when excess demands for money 
actually trigger a decline - or a collapse - of the money supply because 
of a phenomenon known as multiple deposit contraction. It is indeed 
the multiple-contraction effect that actually accounts for the 
generalized nature of the phenomenon. A particularly dramatic 
instance of this phenomenon relates to the financial difficulties 
prevailing at the time of the onset of the Great Contraction and
strangely enough Horwitz himself mentions this example.4
In Chapter 5 of his (2000) Microfoundations of Macroeconomics, 
entitled Monetary equilibrium theory and deflation (141-175), and to 
which he refers on page 228 when criticizing 100% reserve banking for 
not offering a satisfactory solution to Prisoners Dilemma problems 
due to excess demands for money, Horwitz writes:
“(…) prior to the Great Depression, the US economy was able to
avoid significant unemployment for any real length of time
precisely because wages were relatively free to adjust
downward when needed. The Great Depression brought an end to
that policy, as bad economic ideas and the self-interest of
13
labor and politicians led to calls for maintaining nominal
wages in the face of a 30 percent decline in the money supply.
It is of little surprise that the result was 25 percent
unemployment, a failure of one-third of US banks, and
widespread business bankruptcies.”(ibid. 164)
However, these kinds of special circumstances would
never and can never occur under a system of 100% reserve banking.
Under 100% reserve banking a 30% decline in the money supply could 
never have happened in the first place. Therefore Horwitzs attack 
upon the advocates of 100% reserve banking is flawed. It will be 
recalled what the charge against 100% reserve banking is. The 
criticism starts from a distinction, connected with the so-called 
productivity norm, between falling prices necessitated by declines in 
income velocity unmatched by increases in the nominal money supply 
and falling prices caused by increases in factor productivity in specific 
areas of the economy. The latter are perfectly easy to explain precisely 
because they occur in specific times and places and are consistent 
with the profit-seeking interests of the entrepreneurs in question, or 
so the argument goes. Downward movements in the general price level 
due to excess demands for money present Prisoners Dilemma 
problems that changes in factor productivity do not. The claim is that 
fractional-reserve free banking can cope much more satisfactorily with 
the kind of problem posed by excess demands for money and 
accompanying Prisoners Dilemmas than a system subject to a 100% 
reserve requirement. 
Now Horwitz, and other monetary disequilibrium theorists who 
hold similar views, clearly commit a fallacy known as petitio principii.
Horwitzs argument against 100% reserve banking, namely that such 
a system is incapable of coping with a particular kind of problem, 
presupposes or assumes what it ought to prove – or at least render 
plausible - in the first place, namely that this type of problem could 
possibly occur under a regime of 100% reserve banking. Stated 
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differently, the type of problem which Horwitz identifies, can be 
expected to occur exclusively under a monetary regime that is not 
based on a 100% reserve rule. It is a type of problem that is indeed
likely to occur under a regime of fractional-reserve banking. But it 
makes little sense to blame a particular type of monetary regime, such
as a 100% reserve system, for not being able to cope with a particular 
type of problem, if under such a regime such problems would, by 
virtue of the very nature of that regime, be prevented from arising in 
the first place.
In view of such obviously fallacious uses of arguments involving 
the Prisoners Dilemma model, the question can be raised of whether 
game theory may indeed serve as “a gun for hire”. A similar 
phenomenon has been observed in other contexts, for instance in 
political theory. (See e.g. Pellikaan 1994.) Depending upon the 
situation to which a game-theoretical model such as the Prisoners 
Dilemma is to be applied or depending upon the political or ideological 
agenda of the author who wants to use arguments of a game-
theoretical nature,  arguments of this sort may appear as flexibly 
adaptable. Whereas, say, an advocate of government intervention may 
want to choose a one-shot Prisoners Dilemma in order to illustrate 
how individual rationality “inevitably” leads to a collectively 
undesirable result, an author who to the contrary wants to defend free 
markets will choose a repeated Prisoners Dilemma in order to 
demonstrate how cooperation can emerge without central authority
(Axelrod 1984 [1990]), thus illustrating the marvelous achievements of 
spontaneous orders. 
On the other hand, the fact that some uses of game-theoretical 
arguments are obviously questionable or fallacious, is no sufficient 
reason for rejecting such arguments generally. There can be no 
general a priori presumption that Austrians could never make a 
profitable use of game-theoretical arguments. (Foss 2000) 5 An 
illuminating example of a correct and illuminating use of Prisoners 
Dilemma reasoning in the context of business cycle theorizing is 
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provided by Carilli and Dempster (2001). These authors have used the 
Prisoner´s Dilemma framework to model the profit maximizing 
behavior of bankers and the investors under uncertainty when the 
market rate of interest is below the underlying rate of time preference, 
thus questioning the standard account of Austrian business cycle 
theory which posits that central bank manipulations of interest rates 
fool bankers and investors into believing that there has been an 
increase in the real supply of loanable funds available for capital 
investment.
In the next sections I take a further critical look at several uses 
of the Prisoner´s Dilemma model which have been made in the context 
of the ongoing free banking debate with the purpose of examining in 
greater detail the incentives of the banks in a fractional-reserve free 
banking system to engage in credit expansion.
2. Does Fractional-Reserve Free Banking Exemplify the
Tragedy of the Commons? 
Horwitz´ who-goes-first argument invoking the Prisoner´s 
Dilemma game is not the only example of game-theoretical Prisoner´s 
Dilemma reasoning in the context of the debate on free banking. 
In the context of the discussion about the possibilities and limits of 
credit expansion within a system of fractional-reserve free banking, 
the Prisoner´s Dilemma has been invoked both as supporting an 
argument in defense of the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking 
would exhibit endogenous tendencies toward concerted credit 
expansion and as supporting an argument against that thesis.  
In his (2006) Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles Huerta 
de Soto uses a Prisoner´s Dilemma model in order to argue that 
fractional-reserve free banking will tend to evolve towards the 
establishment of a system of central banking, while claiming that 
what is actually involved is an application of Hardin´s classic tragedy 
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of the commons theory.6 The effect of permitting fractional-reserve 
banking is thus considered analogous to that of a tragedy of the 
commons. (De Soto 1998, ch. 8) Therefore, Huerta de Soto concludes, 
a return to a banking system subject to a 100% reserve requirement is 
to be recommended. 
In the most general sense, the tragedy of the commons refers to 
the problem of common property. Inasmuch as property rights are not 
exclusive, privately perceived benefits and costs will differ from total 
gains and costs. As long as nominal owners and actual holders of 
rights to rival goods are not the same persons, the latter are able to 
use the nominal entitlements of the former as common property while 
imposing their use costs on the nominal rights holders. To the extent 
of the positive externality, demand for the resource exceeds the 
optimal level because others pay its price. The resulting problem of 
overexploitation of commonly owned resources may be viewed as the 
central problem of property rights economics. Using the terminology of 
standard public goods theory, overexploitation is to be expected to 
occur whenever the consumption of an asset is rival and non-paying 
users are not excluded from extracting benefits from it. (Mller and 
Tietzel 1999, 42-3)
Commonplace examples of overuse problems of 
resources to which no property rights are assigned are those of 
natural resources where formal rights are non-existent, such as air, 
fishing grounds, oil pools etc. Since Hardin in his celebrated (1968) 
article paradigmatically explored his example of a “pasture open to 
all”, with many villagers driving on their cattle, the notion of a 
“tragedy of the commons” connotes all kinds of examples of resources 
with exclusive rights being absent. Each herdsman, as a rational non-
altruist, will try to keep as many cattle on the commons as will meet 
his individual profit maximum. While the gains of his effort are strictly 
private, the associated costs are shared by all herdsmen, with himself 
bearing only a small fraction. Since a similar calculus holds for each 
individual, the villagers are locked into a dilemma where collective
17
welfare, which is maximized at a lower than the individually optimal 
level of effort, is unattainable owing to individually rational behaviour. 
Two questions can be distinguished in the present context. The 
first question is that of whether credit expansion, if it takes place on a 
more or less significant scale, indeed generates effects similar or 
analogous to those of a tragedy of the commons. The second question, 
which is more closely considered here, is whether the internal 
dynamics of fractional-reserve free banking is such that effects of this 
sort would be endogenously generated under this arrangement. Are 
the effects of fractional-reserve banking indeed similar or analogous to 
the effects of the tragedy of the commons in the sense of Hardin 
(1968)?
It still remains to be examined whether or not the tragedy of the 
commons can be modeled as a Prisoners Dilemma, but supposing at 
this stage, and for the sake of the argument, that it can indeed be 
thus modeled, it is intuitively clear that we would want to conceive of 
the collectively undesirable outcome, that is to say the outcome which 
is inefficient from the perspective of society as a whole,  as 
corresponding to the inefficient equilibrium in the game, that is to say 
the outcome of “mutual defection”. (See further.)
Huerta de Soto, however, conceives of the interaction pattern
between (initially only two) banks in a fractional-reserve free banking 
system as a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma in the following manner (see 
Table VIII-2 on page 667):
Bank A
Does not expand          Expands
Does not expand 
R: Survival S: Failure of A   
of both Survival of B
(reduced profits)
Bank B                             ________________________________
Expands P: Failure of B    Q: Large profits 
Survival of A      for both
18
In order to bring this representation into better agreement with 
conventional textbook representations of the Prisoners Dilemma 
game, we switch the positions of the two players so that Player A 
becomes the row player. This modification yields the following 
substantially equivalent representation:
Bank B
Does not expand          Expands
Does not expand 
R: Survival P: Failure of B
of both       Survival of A
(reduced profits)
Bank A ________________________________
Expands                   S: Failure of A    Q: Large profits 
Survival of B      for both
It will be noted that the “inefficient” equilibrium of this non-
cooperative game, which is the outcome in which both banks abstain 
from expanding, that is to say the outcome which represents mutual 
defection, is here located in the upper left corner. The conventional 
matrix representation of the Prisoners Dilemma game which can be 
found in most textbooks and which has already been provided 
previously is different from the representation used by Huerta de Soto 
in that it is the efficient outcome which is usually located in the upper 
left corner while the inefficient equilibrium outcome is located in the 
lower right corner.
Although the question of where to locate the respective – and in 
particular the main-diagonal - outcomes in the game is a conventional 
matter and does not concern the substance of the argument, for 
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reasons of convenience we again modify the representation along more 
familiar lines, as follows:
Bank B
Expands                      Does not expand
Expands
Q: Large profits             S: Failure of A
for both       Survival of B
Bank A ________________________________
Does not expand P: Failure of B    R: Survival
Survival of A      of both
(reduced profits)
Substantially this representation is identical to the one provided 
by Huerta de Soto (2006, 667).  Player As preference ordering is P > Q 
> R > S while Player Bs preference ordering is S > Q > R > P.
This conceptualization is here intended to elucidate the typical 
tragedy of the commons effect which is supposed to appear under 
fractional-reserve free banking: bankers face the almost irresistible 
temptation to be the first to initiate a policy of expansion,
particularly if they expect all other banks to follow suit to one degree 
or another. In a Prisoner’s Dilemma configuration comprising only two 
banks, if either bank expands credit alone, its viability and solvency 
will be endangered by interbank clearing mechanisms,
which will rapidly shift its reserves to the other bank if the first fails to 
suspend its credit expansion policy in time. Furthermore, the 
situation in which both banks simultaneously initiate credit 
expansion - a strategy which yields the same large profits to both
20
- represents the mutually cooperative outcome, while the situation in 
which neither of the banks expands and both maintain a prudent 
policy of loan concession represents the outcome of mutual defection. 
Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that the interaction 
configuration between banks in a fractional-reserve free banking 
system can indeed be thus conceptualized as a Prisoner´s Dilemma, in 
the manner depicted by Huerta de Soto. Fractional-reserve free banker 
White apparently adopts a similar conceptualization. (White 1995, 16; 
see further)  White is not explicit about the game-theoretical structure 
of the interaction pattern he envisages, but he clearly believes that 
cooperation between independent banks in view of concerted 
expansion would not be a self-enforcing outcome, that is to say such 
an outcome is costly to enforce or, stated differently, the interaction 
pattern would be of the Prisoner´s Dilemma game type rather than of 
the Coordination Game type of interaction. (See also footnote 5.) 
White´s reference to the analogy with the breakdown of cartels 
reinforces this conclusion since in conventional price theory the 
breakdown of cartels is indeed considered perfectly analogous to the 
Prisoner´s Dilemma. (see e.g. Landsburg 2002, 399-403) Therefore I 
assume that White has indeed a Prisoner´s Dilemma type of 
interaction pattern in mind.
Even if the interaction pattern between banks in a fractional-
reserve free banking system can be represented in the aforementioned 
manner as a classic Prisoner´s Dilemma, the ways in which Huerta de 
Soto incorporates this conceptualization into his argument against 
fractional-reserve free banking and in favour of the alternative 
definition of free banking as being based on a 100% reserve 
requirement, presents three anomalies:
(1) First, it does not support the aforementioned author´s conclusion 
that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the 
establishment or the re-establishment of a central bank. This author
indeed argues that it follows from the aforementioned interaction 
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configuration that the two banks will face a strong temptation to 
arrive at an agreement and, in order to avoid the adverse 
consequences of acting independently, to initiate a joint
policy of credit expansion, and particularly, to urge authorities to 
create a central bank. However, and although the aforementioned 
authors conclusion may find some support in historical fact, without 
a more detailed description of how, in the absence of extra-market 
devices and interventions such as those of a central bank, the two 
banks will actually coordinate their courses of action upon the 
mutually cooperative outcome (in-concert expansion), the argument is 
not tight. Indeed, according to the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game all players will end up defecting so that no overexpansion will 
ensue. This is apparently the conclusion L. White (1995, 16) had in 
mind when he wrote:
“Concerted expansion by a multiplicity of independent banks is 
implausible for the same well-known reasons that the attempt to build 
a stable cartel arrangement among many firms is unlikely to be 
successful in any industry in the absence of a legal mechanism
enforcing cartelisation. Any firm not abiding by the cartel agreement 
could capture whatever benefits the agreement is supposed to bring 
the industry to a greater extent than a firm adhering to the 
agreement.”
It may be useful to summarily remind of the role and nature of 
the interbank clearing mechanism in this context and its modus 
operandi in correcting over-issue by an individual bank. Under a 
system of fractional-reserve free banking overissue by an individual 
bank will be corrected through what nineteenth-century writers 
referred to as a process of “reflux”, the return of excess currency to 
the over-issuing bank. Nineteenth-century writers, when they spoke of 
the return of excess currency to the over-issuing bank as a process of 
“reflux”, emphasized the potential for over-issue. The contemporary 
fractional-reserve free bankers believe that an equal amount of 
attention should also be paid to the potential for under-issue.
22
Whites reconstruction of the “law of the reflux” (see e.g. White 
1999, Chapter 3) is based upon the supposition that for any particular 
bank, there is an equilibrium size of its currency circulation - the
same is true for its deposits - that satisfies a set of equimarginal 
conditions. This size is the value of the publics desired holdings of 
currency issued by bank i, given the banks operating costs, that is to 
say its optimizing expenditures on non-price competition. 
Let us denote the value of the publics desired holdings of currency 
issued by bank i as N*ip, where the subscript p indicates the public for 
whom the currency is an asset, the subscript i denotes the issuing 
bank for whom it is a liability, and * means that it is a desired value.
It can now be explained how Nip converges on N*ip as the public 
adjusts toward its desired portfolio of assets. Suppose that excess 
currency is introduced by means of loans. The borrowers spend the 
currency. The recipients of the spending now have balances of bank i 
currency in excess of their desired levels. A recipient individual q for 
whom Niq>N*iq can respond in any of three ways. Direct redemption for
reserves at the issuers counter free bankers consider the least likely 
way since it is assumed that in a mature system little or no reserve 
money is held by the public. Clearly this would directly reduce the 
banks reserves Ri - as well as in the first place but simultaneously Ni.
Deposit of the excess currency into another bank – the bank where q 
keeps his demand deposit account - would bring the currency-
exchange mechanism into play, generating adverse clearings for the 
overissuer as the recipient bank presents the deposited currency 
claims for redemption at the clearinghouse. Settling the clearing 
balances entails a loss of reserves Ri just as direct redemption does. 
The volume of currency in circulation Ni is reduced by the return of 
the excess currency to bank i, unless the bank immediately reissues
it. However, the reserve loss signals to bank i that reissuing the 
currency would lead to further haemorrhaging of reserves, so it should 
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accept the reduction in its circulation. Deposit of the excess currency 
into bank i itself would not generate adverse clearings. However, it 
does mean a higher marginal interest cost of liabilities, and a higher
liquidity cost, than before the expansion. An issuer that was
maximizing profit before will thus find the expansion now
unprofitable. Spending the excess currency transfers the excess
to a new individual who also has the same three options. This
new individual will directly redeem or deposit the currency,
leading again to a reserve loss for bank i and a contraction of Ni. As a 
consequence of reserve losses, bank i finds its reserves lower than it 
desires (Ri<R*i). The marginal net benefit of holding reserves now 
exceeds the marginal net revenue from making loans or holding 
securities, prompting the bank to sell securities (or not roll over 
maturing loans) in order to increase its reserves. Reserves return to 
bank i from the rest of the banking system.
It would be correct to point out that even if it is true that the 
inter-bank clearing mechanism thus limits and puts a check upon 
isolated expansionary schemes – expansion by an individual bank – it 
does not serve to limit credit expansion in a fractional-reserve free 
banking system if most banks decide to simultaneously expand their 
loans, that is to say to expand in unison. However, assuming a 
laissez-faire context consisting of a multiplicity of independent banks, 
hypothesizing a one-shot Prisoners Dilemma configuration would of 
course not be a sufficient ground for arguing plausibly that the in-
concert expansion scenario is what will actually happen.
From this perspective Huerta de Sotos argument apparently
assumes or pre-supposes what it sets out to demonstrate in the first 
place, namely the emergence or the existence of a central bank or of a 
similar device intent upon orchestrating the in-concert credit 
expansion by all the banks in the system. Again the argument seems 
to involve a petitio principii of sorts.
The breakdown of cartels is indeed perfectly analogous to the 
Prisoners Dilemma. If a cartel is to succeed, it needs an enforcement 
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mechanism, that is to say a way to monitor members actions and a 
way to punish those who cheat. (see also Landsburg 2002, 399ff.)
As a model of a tragedy of any sort caused by concerted credit 
expansion, the use of the Prisoners Dilemma model in the 
aforementioned manner is not a convincing representation. According 
to this very representation, no tragedy will take place at all. If the two 
banks play their unique dominant strategy, the “inefficient” outcome, 
here characterized by the absence of credit expansion, will ensue. In 
this sense the aforementioned conceptualization is a correct 
representation of precisely the opposite of what it claims; it is a 
correct representation of the absence of any tragedy. 
Therefore the aforementioned one-shot Prisoners Dilemma 
configuration does not support the conclusion that fractional-reserve 
free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. 
Different – or at least additional - assumptions would be needed to 
draw this conclusion. Under laissez-faire, which is the hypothesized 
institutional context, mutual defection – characterized by the absence
of concerted credit expansion – is and remains the unique 
equilibrium.
(2) Second, the outcome which is inefficient from the standpoint of the 
banks in the Prisoners Dilemma game, is the outcome which is 
efficient from the perspective of the rest of society, or from the 
perspective of society as a whole, while the cooperative efficient 
outcome from the standpoint of the banks – which represents in-
concert credit expansion by the entire banking system - is the 
outcome which from the standpoint of society must be considered a 
tragedy, that is to say sub-optimal.
In a conventional game-theoretic representation of a tragedy of 
the commons – or of any other tragedy for that matter – we would 
expect the efficient, cooperative outcome to be the outcome which 
represents the absence of any tragedy, as it may result, for instance, 
from the imposition of an adequate property rights regime but which, 
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in the absence of any such property rights regime, remains the Pareto-
efficient but unattainable optimum. In the absence of an adequate 
property rights regime, the non-Pareto-optimal (inefficient) tragedy will 
ensue in what we would consider an adequate representation from a 
more conventional viewpoint.
(3) Third, the Prisoners Dilemma modeling does not yet turn the 
interaction configuration into a tragedy of the commons in the sense in 
which this concept was introduced in Garret Hardins popular 1968 
paper.
In fact game-theoretically the tragedy of the commons in the 
sense of Hardin (1968) is not exactly modeled as a two-person
Prisoners Dilemma. The two-person tragedy of the commons is 
conventionally represented as a “Stag Hunt” game. In this 
representation the socially optimal situation corresponds to the C-C 
outcome in the game.7 Therefore apparently the expression ”tragedy of 
the commons” is used in this context only in a metaphorical and not 
in a strictly literal sense, at least insofar as reference is to be made to 
Garret Hardins 1968 use of this concept.
To the extent concerted credit expansion and its effects indeed 
present a genuine analogy with a tragedy of the commons, this 
analogy results from three circumstances:
(a) as the Austrian theory of the business cycle explains, credit 
expansion engineered by the banks causes large-scale intertemporal 
discoordination, misallocation of capital and thus a waste of 
resources; 
(b) the deeper causes of this state of affairs can be explained in terms 
of an inadequate definition and/or enforcement of property rights;
(c) it is assumed that the “tragedy” can be cured by the imposition of a 
more adequate property rights regime.
26
Therefore it can indeed be assumed that concerted credit expansion 
by the banks in a fractional-reserve banking system would constitute 
a real tragedy of sorts, somewhat analogous – although not strictly 
identical - to Hardins well-known tragedy of the commons.
The aforementioned matrix representation, in which the 
cooperative outcome yields large profits for both banks, represents a 
short run outcome only. We have noted, however, that under the 
assumption that the banks indeed adopt a myopic “self-regarding” 
perspective by trying to maximize their short-run profits from credit 
expansion, the banks are in virtue of the very logic of the Prisoners 
Dilemma game, and in the absence of additional assumptions, unable 
to achieve this outcome since when both banks play their unique 
dominant strategy the “inefficient” no-expansion outcome results.
Moreover, if it is true that credit expansion by the banking 
system is a tragedy of sorts, than intuitively we would want to model 
this fact in such a manner that the “tragedy” is represented by the 
inefficient outcome in the game – in terms of a Prisoners Dilemma 
game: the outcome “mutual defection” - and the absence of the 
tragedy by the Pareto-optimal efficient outcome in the game – in terms 
of a Prisoners Dilemma game: the outcome “mutual cooperation”.
The aforementioned representation - which models the situation from 
the myopic perspective of the banks and not from the perspective of 
society at large - the efficient (Pareto-optimal) but unattainable  
outcome is concerted credit expansion, while the attainable but 
inefficient (non-Pareto-optimal) equilibrium outcome is the situation in 
which both banks refrain from credit expansion. This latter outcome, 
however, represents the situation which is efficient from the 
perspective of society at large. This means that from the perspective of 
society at large – but of course not from the short-run perspective of 
the banks - one could read the aforementioned model as an argument 
in favour of fractional-reserve free banking, rather than an argument 
against fractional-reserve free banking. 
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3. An Alternative Matrix Representation
The assumptions underlying the previous matrix construction 
are not compelling, however. Supposing a purely laissez-faire context 
with no central bank or lender of last resort, the banks may well 
acknowledge the fact that their long-run interests essentially coincide 
with those of society at large. If they act imprudently by over-
expanding there will be no central bank to come to their rescue and 
bail them out. 
As is well explained by the Austrian theory of the business 
cycle, the huge profits yielded by credit expansion are only a short run 
phenomenon and in fact – one could argue – illusory when considered 
from a perspective that takes into account the more remote 
consequences of credit expansion. The credit expansion engineered by 
the banking system will set in motion spontaneous market processes 
which reverse the distorting effects of the expansion. Huerta de Soto 
himself offers an essential clue to better insight into these matters 
since he explains in detail in several chapters of his book how these 
reversion processes will cause systematic crises in the banking 
system. In this sense, while in the short run in-concert credit 
expansion may yield huge profits to the banks, the more remote 
effects of such credit expansion will, in the absence of a central bank 
or similar device, be detrimental to the banks themselves.
If we drop the assumption that the interaction configuration 
should be modeled from a myopic “self-regarding” perspective of the 
banks and if we reformulate the model from the perspective of society 
at large by placing the dominant no-expansion outcome in the upper 
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left corner and by re-labeling this outcome as one of “Sustainable 
Economic Growth”, the following result ensues:
Player B (Bank)
Does not expand          Expands
Does not expand R:  Sustainable              P: Failure of B
Economic Growth          Survival of A
Player A (Bank)              ________________________________
Expands                S:  Failure of A Q: Tragedy                                                                               
Survival of B
In this representation the expansive course of action of the
individual banks no longer means “Cooperation” and the prudent 
course of action of an individual bank no longer means “Defection”. 
From the standpoint of society at large, it can indeed be considered 
efficient that an individual bank which acts imprudently by
unilaterally over-expanding goes bankrupt, and that an individual 
bank which acts prudently by restraining from credit expansion 
survives and prospers in the long run. Therefore the expansive 
strategy is the defective one and the non-expansive strategy is the 
cooperative one. The outcomes in which one of the banks defects 
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while the other bank cooperates are represented by the off-diagonal 
elements in the matrix. However, these off-diagonal outcomes no 
longer function as attractors towards the now mutually defective (D-D) 
outcome – as is the case in a Prisoners Dilemma game - since we 
drop the assumption that the banks myopically pursue the aim of 
maximizing short-run profits from credit expansion but instead 
assume that the banks recognize the dangers inherent in credit 
expansion and thus adopt a perspective that is more in agreement 
with the long-run interests of society at large. In this sense one could 
say it is assumed that the banks choose “morally” or act in 
accordance with a “social norm”.
Obviously this matrix representation no longer represents a 
Prisoners Dilemma. Under the previous representation, where it was 
assumed that the expansive strategy is the cooperative one and that 
the banks choose “egoistically” and “myopically”, Player As preference 
ordering was indeed P > Q > R > S and Player Bs preference ordering 
was S > Q > R > P. These were indeed the orderings which 
characterize the pay-off structure of the Prisoners Dilemma game.
Under the modified conceptualization where the banks are 
assumed to choose “morally” and to act in accordance with the “social 
norm”, the mutually defective outcome is the outcome in which both 
banks choose the expansive strategy and it is labeled “Tragedy”. The 
efficient cooperative outcome is the one in which both banks choose 
the cooperative strategy by refraining from credit expansion and it is  
labeled “Sustainable Economic Growth”. It is the outcome which is 
efficient both from the perspective of the long-run interests of the 
banks and from the perspective of society at large. This latter efficient
outcome is precisely the outcome that will be realized by a free 
banking system. This representation illustrates the fact that free 
banking is an effective mechanism for avoiding the tragedy resulting 
from generalized credit expansion.  As we have seen, this conclusion 
was also implicit in the previous matrix construction. The modified 
matrix representation is different, however, in that the no-expansion 
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outcome is now considered efficient even from the standpoint of the 
banks themselves. 
Player As preference ordering is now, say, R > P > S > Q, while 
Player Bs ordering is R > S > P > Q. Clearly this is no longer a 
Prisoners Dilemma game. This fact illustrates that a modification of 
the assumptions about the motives of the players, for instance by 
assuming that they choose “morally” or in accordance with the “social
norm” rather than “egoistically” and in a purely “self-regarding” 
manner, thus radically changes the structure of the game.
In the modified representation it is assumed that the mutually 
cooperative outcome in the game represents the situation in which the 
banks exercise some restraint by refraining from credit expansion, a 
course of action which involves foregoing some profit opportunities in 
the short run and which in the short run imposes an opportunity cost 
upon the banks in the form of foregone short-run profit opportunities.
Still it is the outcome which is in the long run interests both of the 
banks and of society at large. Indeed in the longer run the interests of 
the banks coincide with those of society at large and it is not too 
unrealistic to assume that the banks might conceivably recognize this 
possible harmony of interests in the longer run. 
The outcome in the upper left corner is conceptualized as the 
cooperative outcome, not only because it is the efficient outcome from 
the long-run perspective of the banks themselves but also and 
foremost because it is the outcome which ensures a long-run harmony 
of interests between the banking sector and its allies on the one hand 
and the rest of society on the other. By refraining from credit 
expansion the banks act in a manner which serves both their own 
longer-run interests and the interests of other market participants.
Of course throughout a laissez-faire context is assumed, without 
central banks or similar devices.
In our modified outcome matrix, the outcomes, when considered 
in “physical” or objective terms, are identical to the outcomes in 
Huerta de Sotos matrix on page 667 of his (2006) book. Under the 
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modified representation the outcomes are re-labeled in accordance 
with their true significance from the standpoint of society; it is no 
longer assumed that the actors in the game will “automatically” 
perceive the outcome matrix as a Prisoners Dilemma. By abandoning 
the assumption that the actors – ex hypothesi the banks in a 
fractional-reserve free banking system – are motivated by myopically 
“self-regarding” considerations, the assumption that the actors will 
necessarily attach to the objective outcomes the preference ordering of 
a Prisoners Dilemma game has been abandoned. Which motives 
motivate the actors and which preference ordering they adopt with 
respect to the objective outcomes, now becomes a matter for empirical 
investigation. The implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one 
relationship between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix, or 
between a particular outcome matrix and a particular preference 
ordering with respect to the outcomes in that matrix has been 
dropped. Whenever the banks myopically attempt to maximize their 
short-run net gains from credit expansion, the preference orderings 
adopted by the players (banks) correspond to those of a Prisoners 
Dilemma:  P > Q > R > S for the row player. But whether a bank in a 
fractional-reserve free banking system actually adopts a perspective 
embracing this preference ordering is an empirical matter. If it is 
assumed to the contrary, as we have done, that the banks may adopt 
a long-run free market perspective, which leads them to perceive their 
own interests as being basically coincident with those of society at 
large and to choose “morally” or act in accordance with a “social 
norm”, the preference ordering effectuated with respect to the 
outcomes will no longer be that of a Prisoners Dilemma. For Player A, 
it may now be, for instance: R > P > S > Q.
Modeling the outcome characterized by the absence of global in-
concert credit expansion as the efficient outcome in the game is also
in better agreement with our intuitions about what is and what is not 
desirable for society. It is the outcome which will result if banks take 
an essentially long-run perspective, knowing that when they get in 
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trouble there will be no lender of last resort to come to their rescue. 
Replacing the laissez-faire context by a different institutional setting –
or lobbying for such a replacement - is simply not an option for the 
banks under this hypothesis.
The representation exclusively from the “myopic” short-run 
perspective of the banks delivers the intuitively paradoxical result that 
the mutually cooperative, Pareto-optimal outcome in the game 
represents the outcome which is actually worst from the perspective of 
society as a whole since, as the Austrian theory of the business cycle 
explains, credit expansion by the entire banking system will distort 
the productive structure and provoke widespread, inter-temporal 
discoordination in the economy. But since the inevitable reversion 
effects of the credit expansion process will also hit the banking sector 
this outcome is not even efficient from the perspective of the interests 
of the banks themselves once a longer time perspective is adopted. It 
is indeed far from obvious that, especially from a longer-run 
perspective, the outcome consisting of concerted credit expansion by 
all the banks is in the interest of the banks themselves since the 
reversion processes which will necessarily be provoked by the credit 
expansion will also hit the banking sector.
The question remains: What is the institutional mechanism to 
be imposed to make the efficient outcome (under the new 
representation) the outcome which will actually be realised? Advocates 
of the 100% reserve requirement in banking will contend that
obviously this outcome can be achieved by legally imposing a 100% 
reserve requirement upon the banks, assuming that such a
requirement can be effectively enforced. Advocates of a fractional-
reserve free banking system to the contrary can reply that it seems 
doubtful from the perspective of economic theory whether a 100% 
reserve requirement is a strictly necessary condition - although it is 
probably sufficient - for obtaining the desired result, since the (from 
the standpoint of society) efficient no-expansion outcome is the
equilibrium outcome in the game.
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From this perspective imposing a 100% reserve requirement 
appears as an instance of regulatory overshooting so to speak, since, 
as we have seen, in a purely laissez-faire context the interbank
clearing mechanism by itself constitutes a sufficient mechanism to 
guarantee the desirable outcome. This does not mean, of course, that 
there may not exist good independent reasons or arguments of an 
ethical or of a legal-theoretic nature in favor of the imposition of such 
a 100% reserve requirement. We are here only concerned with 
economic logic.
Nevertheless advocates of a 100% reserve requirement in 
banking might still question whether the game-theoretical 
representation indeed captures the essential characteristics and 
elements of the interaction pattern between the banks, thus 
questioning the conclusion that the interbank clearing mechanism 
constitutes a sufficient check upon in-concert credit expansion by the 
banks. One such possibility is explored in Hlsmann (2000). This
author conceives of a possible expansive scenario in the following 
terms. If it is possible to bring some extra money title into circulation 
then this represents an opportunity for other banks to expand their
issues. A bank that receives from one of its customers a money title 
from another bank can, rather than present the title to its issuer for 
redemption, issue more of its own money titles and “back” them with 
nothing but the title of the other bank. This in turn permits other 
banks - for example, the issuer of the original “excessive” title - to do 
the same thing. By this sort of zigzag process, all the banks can 
increase their title issues at virtually zero cost. Of course it is not 
possible for an individual bank to issue huge quantities of uncovered 
money titles at once and all on its own. But over time and in concert 
with other banks it can do this through a zigzag process of the sort 
described. (Hlsmann 2000, 10) As Hlsmann contends, under 
fractional reserves, the cost of currency issue for any given bank is not 
independent of the decisions of the other banks. The more titles a 
bank chooses to hold, the more titles it can issue, and this permits 
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other banks to do the same thing. In doing this bankers reduce the 
title-issue costs of their fellow bankers to virtually zero. All bankers 
have a strong incentive to do this since they all gain from the 
fractional-reserve business at the expense of the other market 
participants.
One could add to this account that on Selgins and Whites own 
account of the working properties of a fractional-reserve free banking 
system, this scenario is indeed rather likely to happen since on this 
account an increase in the demand to hold on to bank liabilities must 
lead to an increase of title issues. This feature of the system is even 
seen as one of its main advantages and virtues. Consider the case of 
an individual bank i experiencing a rise in demand to hold its 
currency. (For simplicity the following analysis is in terms of currency, 
but the analysis applies equally to deposits.) An increase in the 
demand to hold bank is currency, unmatched by an increase in the 
supply, creates the reverse of an overexpansion. As the fractional-
reserve free bankers see it, the actual circulation then falls short of the 
desired circulation. Suppose the bank customers, whose demand for i-
currency has risen, hold on to more i-currency instead of spending it. 
Less i-currency enters the clearing system, and bank i enjoys positive 
clearings. As a result, bank i finds its reserves greater than desired, 
and is prompted by the profit motive to expand its loans and 
securities holdings, increasing its interest income and ridding itself of 
undesired reserves. In the new equilibrium reserves are returned to (or 
nearly to) their old level, with a larger volume of i-currency in 
circulation and a larger portfolio of earning assets. This is the sense in 
which according to the fractional-reserve free bankers the supply of 
money is demand-elastic: bank i finds it profitable to respond to a rise 
in the “desired” level of circulation by raising the actual circulation, 
and the reverse for a fall.
However, from the standpoint of the individual banker, it is not 
prima facie clear how to distinguish between a situation in which the 
public holds on to more of its titles and a situation in which other 
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banks hold on to them, instead of presenting them for redemption, in 
view of expanding their own issue. Thus as soon as, say, bank A holds 
on to some titles issued by bank B instead of presenting them for 
redemption this fact will have for B the same appearance as an 
increase in the demand of the public to hold on to its currency and
this fact will thus induce B to issue more titles. Now this fact allows A
to issue more of its own titles with no cost in terms of anticipated 
reserve losses. So the point is that each issue of a title not backed by 
money represents an additional opportunity for other banks to expand 
their own uncovered issues. Each bank discovers how many 
uncovered titles it can issue at any point in time; and these issues 
change the conditions for the other banks, which can now discover 
that they can go a little further with their own issues, and so forth. 
Since all the banks as well as their clients have at least a short run 
incentive to engage into this sort of in-concert expansion process, it is 
not obvious anything will restrain this process from running its 
course. Hlsmann is not explicit about whether this scenario can be
modeled game-theoretically, and if so, how it should thus be modeled. 
Hlsmann seems to assume that all banks would obviously be willing 
to participate in the expansion. No bank is interested in choosing the 
outcome “unilateral defection”. The situation would then probably be 
better modeled as a Coordination Game. This is an issue upon which 
further research on the topic of free banking along the lines suggested 
by Hlsmann might focus closer attention. In any case, and while 
there is probably no need to deny that Hlsmanns scenario is a 
possible scenario in the short run, it is not immediately clear why, in a 
purely laissez-faire context, and in the absence of a central bank or
similar devices, this scenario should be supposed or assumed to 
necessarily occur in the real world. The assumption that “obviously all 
banks will be willing to participate in the expansion”, thus manifesting 
a preference for short-run gains from credit expansion and neglecting 
the more remote harmful consequences of credit expansion, is no 
more than that: an assumption. It is not logically contradictory to 
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make this assumption but whether it actually obtains in a historical 
context is a matter for empirical investigation in every particular case. 
Moreover, as Mises reminds us (1998, 433), free banking is 
defined by the fulfillment of two conditions: coexistence and 
independence of a multiplicity of banks. If it is simply assumed, 
however, that no bank would be interested in taking a course of action 
which is independent of that of the other banks, the latter condition is 
simply assumed away. Again the argument seems to pre-suppose or to 
assume what it sets out to demonstrate in the first place. Therefore, 
contrary to Hülsmann, we assume independence of the banks and 
therefore the possibility of unilateral defection on the part of the 
banks. But then White´s objection, quoted above, still applies.
In case it is assumed that the interaction configuration is
indeed best modeled as a Prisoner´s Dilemma, the obvious way to try 
to counter White´s objection seems to consist in modeling the 
interaction pattern as a repeated Prisoner´s Dilemma game. Game-
theoretical experiments and arguments have contributed to the 
understanding of the conditions under which cooperation will be 
induced by rational self-motivated behavior in repeated Prisoner´s 
Dilemma games. (See e.g. Axelrod 1984 [1990].) 8
All of the foregoing is of course not intended to deny that the 
introduction of a lender of last resort in the form of a central bank 
radically changes the interaction pattern. In fact it is only the 
introduction of a central bank which leads to the institutionalization of 
generalized credit expansion. Independence of the individual banks is 
no longer assumed. All the banks participate in the expansion in 
coordinated fashion. This means that in any matrix representation the 
off-diagonal outcomes lose their significance. The only remaining 
choices are those between more and less expansion. The tragedy is 
unavoidable, but it still makes sense to distinguish between more or 
less severe instances of the process. Depending upon the volume of 
the expansion and the velocity of the process, the ultimate effects 
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might appear sooner or later. An approximate matrix construction 
might then rather yield something like the following pay-off structure:
Bank B
More expansion          Less expansion
More expansion     Tragedy arrives sooner/
is more severe
X
Bank A ________________________________
Less expansion X                 Tragedy arrives later/
is less severe
It is to be understood that the whole process is orchestrated by 
the central monetary authorities. In this situation in which the 
banking system will extract huge amounts of wealth from the rest of 
society, obviously the interests of the banking system no longer 
coincide with those of society at large.
4. Conclusion
We can concur with Foss (2000) conclusion that Austrians 
ought to explore ways to incorporate game theoretic reasoning into 
their analyses, despite their otherwise highly distinctive and unique 
approach to the topic of “microfoundations for macroeconomics”.
An examination of various attempted uses of the well-known 
Prisoners Dilemma model has also led us to conclude, however, that 
the introduction of game-theoretical models into Austrian analyses 
should always proceed with great caution. In particular in the context 
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of the ongoing debate on free banking the Prisoners Dilemma model 
has been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. 
As regards in particular the use of the One-Shot Prisoners 
Dilemma configuration in the context of an argument against 
fractional-reserve free banking, it has appeared that this argument 
does not support the in-concert overexpansion thesis and that 
different – or at least additional - assumptions would be needed to 
support this thesis. Nor does it support the thesis that fractional-
reserve free banking will tend to evolve towards central banking. When 
modeling the interaction configuration between banks in a fractional-
reserve free banking system, we have abandoned the implicit 
assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between 
the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged 
that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not 
necessarily adopt a “myopic”, self-regarding perspective but may 
recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking 
sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a 
different matrix representation emerge.
Ludwig van den Hauwe
Brussels
Notes
1 For a short introduction to capital-based macroeconomics, see 
Garrison (2005). For an extensive comparison of capital-based 
macroeconomics with other macroeconomic paradigms, see also 
Garrison (2001).
2 In particular L. M. Lachmann had been especially critical of the style 
of thought he characterized as macro-economic formalism. We may 
speak of formalism whenever a form of thought devised in a certain 
context, in order to deal with a problem existing there and then, is 
later used in other contexts without due regard for its natural 
limitations. (Lachmann 1973, 16) The schools that adopt the macro-
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economic approach are tempted to regard as “macro-variables” what 
are in reality the cumulative results of millions of individual actions. 
Since these micro-economic actions are not necessarily repeated from 
day to day, even less from year to year, we have no reason at all to 
believe in the aggregative constancy of the macro-variables over time. 
(Lachmann 1973, 23) This means that macroeconomics is safely used 
only by economists who are constantly aware of the substructure of 
individual choices and decisions. It is unsafe in the hands of 
economists who think it replaces the substructure.
3 For a semi-popular account of the history of the Prisoners Dilemma, 
see Poundstone (1992). Puzzles with the structure of the Prisoners
Dilemma were first devised and discussed by Merrill Flood and Melvin 
Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand Corporations investigations into 
game theory, which Rand pursued because of possible applications to 
global nuclear strategy. See also: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
op.cit.
4 These were very well described by Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz in their A Monetary History of the United States. ([1963] 
1993). As they explain:
“The deposit-currency ratio has been of major importance primarily 
during periods of financial difficulties. In each such period, the 
public’s loss of confidence in banks led to an attempt to convert 
deposits into currency which produced a sharp decline in the ratio of 
deposits to currency and strong downward pressure on the stock of 
money. The establishment of the Federal Reserve System was 
expected to deprive such shifts in the deposit-currency ratio of 
monetary significance by providing a means of increasing the absolute 
volume of currency available for the public to hold,
when the public desired to substitute currency for deposits, without
requiring a multiple contraction of deposits. In practice, it did not 
succeed in achieving that objective. The most notable shift in the 
deposit-currency ratio in the 93 years from 1867 to 1960 occurred 
from 1930 to 1933, when the ratio fell to less than half its initial value 
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and in three years erased the secular rise of three decades. Though 
the absolute volume of currency held by the public rose, it did so only 
at the expense of a very much larger decline in deposits, the combined 
effect being a decline of one-third in the total stock of money. 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1993, pp. 684–85)
5 Foss (2000) main conclusion, namely, that Austrians should 
approach and make use of game theory in economics can be granted.
This author emphasized the relevance of the literature on iterated 
Coordination Games which is indeed of potential interest to Austrians. 
With the proviso provided in the text, we believe that the same is of 
true of the literature on Prisoners Dilemma games. Whether a 
Coordination Game model or Prisoners Dilemma game model will 
have to be used will depend upon the underlying situation to be 
modeled. The classic contrast between Coordination games and 
Prisoners Dilemma games makes perfect sense since it is illustrative 
of the fact that whereas surely some forms of cooperation are easy to 
reach, others remain prohibitively costly. There is a sense in which 
every industry faces a Prisoners Dilemma: firms within an industry 
could all earn higher profits if they colluded to raise their prices but 
individual firms earn more if they continue to compete. It is not 
difficult to see why this must be true: consumers prefer low prices to 
high prices. If all the other firms collude to charge exorbitantly high 
prices, the profits of the deviant firm that undercuts them rise. The 
difference between a Coordination Game and a Prisoners Dilemma 
game is reflected in the difference between standardizing products and 
fixing prices for instance. These kinds of business cooperation bear 
little resemblance to each other and in fact are radically different. It is 
confusing to conflate them under the generic heading of “collusion”. 
As long as consumers want a uniform product, adhering to industry 
standards is self-enforcing. As long as consumers prefer low prices to 
high prices, price-fixing is not. Reaching the cooperative outcome in 
the former may be relatively easy, while reaching this outcome in the 
latter case may be costly and difficult. In the case of a price fixing 
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cartel, the higher prices actually hurt the consumers and this fact is 
at the basis of the incentive of individual cartel members to deviate 
and continue competing. 
6 Hardin´s chief insight was that open access resources will be 
unsustainably exploited unless some property rights regime is 
imposed for their protection. The question remains which property 
rights regime. Two general solutions are typically offered for resolving 
environmental problems and both of these are acknowledged by 
Hardin (1968, 1245): (1) specify property rights in environmental 
goods, that is, privatize them, or (2) control access to and use of 
environmental goods through governmental regulation. Therefore most 
mainstream economists would consider that the existence of a tragedy 
of the commons problem per se does not yet constitute an argument in 
favour of the first type of solution consisting of privatization, de-
regulation etc. Furthermore it should be noted that law-and-
economics theorists have since long abandoned the idea that private-
property rights have an absolute prerogative to being the efficient 
institutional form and have developed the concept of the optimal 
commons. (e.g. Field 1989; also Papandreou 1994) Therefore critics 
might argue that it does not yet follow directly from any critique of 
fractional-reserve free banking that a 100% reserve gold standard 
would be, in over-all economic efficiency terms, the obviously preferable
alternative. The answer to that question would depend upon the cost 
of establishing and sustaining (protecting) the property rights 
structure consistent with a 100% commodity standard. The latter may 
well remain a costly matter after all, even if on theoretical grounds 
there are good reasons to believe that the working properties of such a 
system have desirable characteristics in terms of efficiency, stability 
and predictability and even on political or ethical grounds, and even if 
the costs of a purely fiat standard have tended to be under-estimated 
until recently. Property rights themselves are costly, and sometimes 
too costly, to impose and protect. Therefore the evolution of property 
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rights is seldom unidirectional, that is to say it moves not always in
the direction of more sharply-defined private rights.
7 A common view is that Garret Hardins popular “the tragedy of the 
commons” has the structure of a multi-player Prisoners Dilemma 
game. This contention must be qualified, however. For the matrix 
representation of the two-person version of the tragedy of the 
commons game, see: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2007, 5 ff.
8 See also Kreps et al. (1982) who actually prove that, given a small 
but positive probability that one of the players is not really a rational 
player but is instead a machine that always plays the tit-for-tat
strategy, if there is a large number of periods then the players will 
cooperate in every period until they are close to the terminal period.
For a classic and excellent summary of most of the game-theoretic 
concepts and arguments, see also Myerson (1991).
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